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1. Introduction
Both logical empiricism and pragmatism have been regarded as “philosophical revolutions”, and
both went through crucial development and transformation during the period this book focuses
on, 1895-1935. This essay can by no means exhaustively analyze these developments. However, I
will  examine  some ways  in  which  more  recent  neopragmatism is  rooted  in  the  “revolution”  of
those years, as well as some neglected pragmatism-related trends in logical empiricism.
The Americanization of originally European analytic philosophy, beginning with
the rise of Nazism in Europe, has been described as a move “from the Vienna Circle to Harvard
Square” (Holton 1993). There are, indeed, significant links between logical empiricism 1  and
American pragmatism; these links can also be argued to have been influential, albeit often
implicitly, in the emergence of what is today known as neopragmatism.2 In the United States, C.I.
Lewis, Ernest Nagel, and W.V. Quine, among others, played an important role as mediators
between these philosophical schools. 3  Another interesting mediating figure – some decades
earlier – between pragmatism and early analytic philosophy was Frank Ramsey, who could have
changed the history of twentieth century philosophy by truly developing a synthesis of these
philosophies, had he lived longer.4 Charles Morris’s “pragmatic empiricism” was yet another
milestone between Vienna and America; Morris argued for the complementarity and even
convergence of pragmatism and logical empiricism throughout the 1930s (see Morris 1937, 1938,
1963; cf. Carnap 1963).
1 I will speak of “logical empiricism” instead of “logical positivism”, unless there is a reason to be more specific. By
“logical empiricism” I understand the somewhat broader set of doctrines, or the slightly more inclusive approach,
that survived the collapse of the Vienna Circle (and thus the collapse of logical positivism in a strict sense).
2 For the distinction between “neopragmatism” and “new pragmatism” (which need not have any explicit relation to
the historical tradition of pragmatism), see Misak (2007).
3 For detailed examinations of the concept of the a priori in logical empiricism, see Friedman (2007) and Mormann
(2012). For discussions of Quine’s problematic place in the pragmatist tradition, see Koskinen and Pihlström (2006)
and Sinclair (2013). In this paper, I will have to mostly ignore both Lewis and Quine.
4 For instance, Ramsey’s 1927 essay, “Facts and Propositions”, articulates a pragmatic understanding of the meaning
of a proposition in terms of the conduct that would result from asserting the proposition. This is, clearly, a position
reminiscent of Charles Peirce’s and William James’s views on meaning. See also Cheryl Misak’s essay in this volume.
2The dialogue between pragmatism and logical empiricism was not restricted to the
work of mediating thinkers like Morris and Nagel who later became somewhat marginalized.
Even  the  giants  of  the  two movements  entered  into  a  dialogue  in  the  early  1930s.  The  mutual
visits across the Atlantic in early 1930s and the preparations for the 1934 International Congress
for Philosophy in Prague (Limbeck-Lilineau 2012), as well as Carnap’s and John Dewey’s
exchange of views on meaning and the nature of philosophical problems in Philosophy of Science in
1934 are examples of this (cf. Shook 1998, 462), as is Hans Reichenbach’s (1939) realistic
criticism of Dewey’s instrumentalist philosophy of science. In the late 1930s, Dewey contributed
to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, a project launched by the Vienna Circle
philosophers.5
Leading scholars of logical empiricism, e.g., Thomas Uebel (1992, 1996, 2007) and
Alan Richardson (1998), have investigated the relations between logical empiricism and twentieth
century naturalism and pragmatism in great detail, drawing attention, for instance, to how
“Quinean” – naturalistic and anti-foundationalist – some of Otto Neurath’s views were decades
before the emergence of Quine’s philosophy (cf. Richardson and Uebel 2007). As Richard
Creath (2007, 335) observes, Quine’s caricature of Carnap’s conventionalism – as something
allegedly entirely different from the pragmatic naturalism Quine himself advanced – has
unfortunately been “endlessly repeated by others”. Gradually this picture has become more
nuanced, to the extent that it is a commonplace today to appreciate the common ideas shared
not only by Quine and Carnap but generally by pragmatism and logical empiricism. Therefore, as
Cheryl Misak (2013, chapter 9) also argues, the thesis that pragmatism, which had flourished in
the US from James’s popular philosophy in the early 1900s until Dewey’s late work between the
world wars, was “eclipsed” by logical empiricism (and later by analytic philosophy) is problematic,
if  not  outright  mistaken.  Not  only  does  the  pragmatic  maxim,  which  urges  us  to  examine  the
meaning of our concepts in terms of the potential practical results of their objects,6 resemble the
logical empiricists’ verificationist theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a
sentence is reducible to its method of verification (and, indeed, only empirically verifiable
sentences are meaningful); also the rejection of unempirical metaphysical speculation, as well as
the intimate link between scientific progress and social progress, can be regarded as points of
contact between the two traditions. Clearly both the pragmatists and the logical empiricists, at
least after the Vienna Circle philosophers’ arrival in the United States, understood this. As Misak
5 For more details and exact references (including archival documentation based on Carnap’s, Schlick’s, Neurath’s
and others’ papers and correspondence), see Limbeck-Lilineau (2012). For Dewey’s Encyclopedia contributions, see
his (1938) and (1939).
6 On the pragmatic maxim and its different versions and applications, see, e.g., Pihlström (ed.) (2011).
3concludes: “The similarities between pragmatism and logical empiricism were there (and where
recognized) from the beginning.” (Ibid., 175.)
Furthermore, there seems to be a growing consensus about the fact that it was the
internal critical development – rather than any external pressure – of the Vienna Circle and of the
logical empiricism following its key members’ emigration in the 1930s that led to positions
relatively close to the naturalistic, fallibilistic pragmatism that had been developed by Dewey and
philosophers like Nagel, Lewis, and Morris. Hence, the contacts between the two traditions that
were established in the early 1930s may not have played any crucial role in this rapprochement.7
The Vienna Circle philosophers might have arrived at their somewhat more relaxed stance – in
comparison to the verificationism many of them had advanced in the 1920s and early 1930s –
even if they had never encountered Dewey and the other pragmatists.
Given this state-of-the-art in the scholarship on the history of pragmatism and
logical empiricism, there is little to be added to the historical picture of what was going on
between 1895 and 1935; I hope, however, to provide a distinctive perspective on these issues by
taking seriously not just the relations between logical empiricism and pragmatism but especially
between  these  two  and neopragmatism. I will focus on the philosophical background of
neopragmatism rather than on the pragmatist tradition as a whole (or logical empiricism as
such),8 seeking to philosophically illuminate some ways in which neopragmatism grows out of
the pragmatism – logical empiricism dialogue. I will not discuss the above-mentioned mediators
(e.g.,  Nagel,  Lewis,  or  Morris);  my  main  focus  in  section  2  below  will  be  on  the  leading
neopragmatist Hilary Putnam’s residual Carnapianism and on a critical discussion of the status of
metaphysics in pragmatism and neopragmatism. It can be shown that while neopragmatism has
successfully moved beyond several logical-empiricist doctrines, such as the dichotomies between
the analytic and synthetic as well as between fact and value (not to forget neopragmatists’ general
rejection of the scientism we associate with logical empiricism), neopragmatism remains
committed to other important logical-empiricist ideas, especially the critique of metaphysics. This
is still clearly manifested, e.g., in Putnam’s rejection of metaphysical realism as well as his
reluctance to formulate his views on the fact-value entanglement in metaphysical terms (cf.
7 See Limbeck-Lilineau (2012). The international philosophy congress in Prague in 1934 was a crucial step in the
emergence of the mutual recognition of pragmatism and logical empiricism, but as Limbeck-Lilineau concludes,
“neither the [logical empiricists’] liberalization of the meaning criterion, nor the introduction of dispositional
concepts was initiated through the contact with pragmatism” (107).
8 Charles Morris used the term “neopragmatism” already in 1928 (thanks are due to Christoph Limbeck-Lilineau for
this important information).
4Pihlström 2010).9 Finally, I will in section 3 make an excursus to the legacy of a rather forgotten
logical empiricist, Eino Kaila, arguing that scientific realism is a (or even the) major issue uniting
the key philosophical concerns of pragmatism and logical empiricism.
Insofar as we want to speak about “philosophical revolutions” in relation to
pragmatism  and  logical  empiricism,  we  may  say  that  while  both  approaches  were  in  their  own
ways revolutionary attempts to set aside traditional non-empirical speculation, neopragmatism
still has not fully recovered from the failure of this attempted revolution. A new revolution is
needed to make neopragmatism more hospitable to metaphysics. By this I do not mean that the
pragmatists should just follow the “metaphysical turn” of recent analytic philosophy; pragmatist
metaphysics should, rather, seek to – revolutionarily? – transform our understanding of
metaphysics itself (cf. Pihlström 2009).
2. Linguistic frameworks and conceptual relativity: Carnap and neopragmatism
The encounter pragmatism had with logical empiricism can be explored by recapitulating some
familiar points about Carnap’s doctrine of linguistic frameworks. This discussion will illuminate
the role of logical empiricism as a source of insights for neopragmatism especially because of the
inspiration Putnam drew from logical empiricism, notably his teachers Carnap and Reichenbach.
Even though Putnam mostly worked with Carnap on inductive logic instead of, say, the realism
issue, this background is rather obvious when we consider the striking similarity between
Putnam’s (1981, 1990) “internal realism” and Carnap’s theory of linguistic frameworks and
internal vs. external questions of existence.10
Paying due attention to Putnam’s Carnapian ideas of conceptual relativity, in
particular, we may ask when neopragmatism emerged. (I  am  not  concerned  with  the  term
“neopragmatism” but with the emergence of some of the distinctive ideas we associate with it.)
There is no trivial answer. Presumably it emerged only in the 1980s when Putnam was busily
defending internal realism and noted its connection with pragmatism (and even pointed out, in
his 1987 volume The Many Faces of Realism and elsewhere, that he should have called internal
realism “pragmatic realism”)? Or perhaps, rather, it emerged in 1979 when Richard Rorty
published Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and shocked his analytic readers by regarding Dewey
9 Richard Rorty’s – another key neopragmatist’s – more “postmodern” critique of metaphysics is, of course, very
different from the logical empiricists’ (and from Putnam’s), but he shares with Carnap et al. the conviction that in
some sense metaphysics fails to make sense.
10 Among Putnam’s many critics, Kenneth Westphal (2003) is particularly explicit in his criticism of this residual
Carnapian element in Putnam’s internal realist position.
5as one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century?11 Or already in 1951 when Quine
in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” exclaimed that our ontological postulations are, “where
rational, pragmatic”, and claimed to represent a “more thorough pragmatism” than Carnap?12
There is hardly any philosophical or historical need to agree about the exact timing
of the birth of neopragmatism. One possible answer, however, is that neopragmatism emerged
already in 1934 when Carnap formulated his famous Toleranzprinzip in Logische Syntax der Sprache.13
According to this principle, “there is no morality in logic”: “In der Logik gibt es keine Moral.
Jeder  mag  seine  Logik,  d.h.  seine  Sprachform,  aufbauen  wie  er  will.  Nur  muss  er,  wenn er  mit
uns diskutieren will, deutlich angeben, wie er es machen will, synktaktische Bestimmungen geben
anstatt philosophischer Erörterungen.” (Carnap 1934, 45.) We can, then, freely choose our
language, provided that we offer syntactic rules and definitions for its expressions. Later Carnap
turned more to semantics, modifying his earlier very restrictive conception of philosophy as the
logical syntax of science, but the fundamental idea of tolerating different linguistic frameworks
serving different purposes survived the changes in the details of his position. This basic view was,
as is well known, elaborated by Carnap in his 1950 essay, “Semantics, Empiricism, and Ontology”
–  famously  criticized  by  Quine  in  “Two  Dogmas”  –  but  the  idea  of  a  plurality  of  languages
through which we categorize reality was there already in 1934. In a sense it was at work already in
1928 in Der logische Aufbau der Welt, in which Carnap had suggested that both phenomenalist and
physicalist – that is, autopsychological and heteropsychological (or eigenpsychische and
fremdpsychische) – starting points for the construction of scientific language (and, hence, for the
“logical construction of the world”) are possible, though the phenomenalist one should be
preferred (see Carnap 1967; cf. Richardson 1998).
It is easy to characterize Carnap’s position as a form of “neopragmatism” by using
his own terminology. Carnap distinguishes between “internal” existence questions that are posed
within a linguistic framework, concerning the existence of certain entities within that framework,
and “external” ones, which concern the adoption of the framework itself. (See Carnap 1950, 209-
210.) The external questions lack theoretical significance; only internal questions can be answered
by means of empirical, scientific research. External questions are resolved only practically;
choosing a linguistic framework instead of another is a matter of effectiveness, fruitfulness, and
simplicity, among other things – not an empirical or theoretical matter (ibid., 210-212, 219). In
11 In addition to Quine, Rorty is another major philosopher that must be more or less neglected in this essay.
12 “Two Dogmas” is available in Quine (1953); for the famous “more thorough pragmatism” quote, see p. 46. An
examination of Quine’s and Carnap’s complex relation would obviously be beyond the scope of this article. For
their correspondence, see Creath (1990). See also, for useful examinations of Quine’s relation to Carnap, Neurath,
and other leading logical empiricists, Isaacson (2004, especially 229-249), as well as Creath (2007).
13 Or even in 1928 when Morris used the term (see above)?
6particular, the problem of the reality of the “world of things” is, metaphysically understood, a
mere pseudoproblem (as Carnap had already argued in the Aufbau and other early works): “To be
real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the framework; hence this concept cannot
be meaningfully applied to the framework itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of
the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems
to  suggest,  but  rather  a  practical  question,  a  matter  of  a  practical  decision  concerning  the
structure of our language.” (Ibid., 210-211.)
As in 1934, Carnap in 1950 maintains a tolerant view on the plurality of linguistic
frameworks. We should, he tells us, “grant to those who work in any special field of investigation
the  freedom  to  use  any  form  of  expression  which  seems  useful  to  them”,  as  the  work  in  that
field “will sooner or later lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function”
(ibid.,  228).  The  paper  concludes  with  a  famous  rule:  “Let us be cautious in making assertions and
critical in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.” (Ibid.)
This is essentially the view that Putnam rediscovered and defended in the 1980s
when arguing that the world possesses no “ready-made” ontological structure of its own but can
be “sliced up” differently by using different conceptual schemes or frameworks – and to which
he still, after having returned to metaphysical realism, at least to some extent adheres. Putnam’s
criticisms of, for instance, Carnap’s methodological solipsism (as expressed in the Aufbau) have
in  no  essential  way  departed  from  the  basic  idea  of  there  being  a  plurality  of  linguistic
frameworks – or conceptual schemes, perspectives, traditions, paradigms (etc.) – through which
we categorize reality, frameworks whose critical comparison is a pragmatic matter undecidable by
empirical and/or theoretical grounds. Moreover, the attempt to arrive at an empirical or
theoretical answer to an external question of existence in an absolute sense, say, to the question
whether there “really” are such things as numbers or tables, verges on meaninglessness. In this
sense Putnam, even today, to some extent remains a Carnapian – even after his realism has
become stronger as a result of his rejection of the epistemic theory of truth that, arguably, was
practically indistinguishable from the logical empiricists’ verificationism. 14 It is undeniable that
Quine’s (1969) later ontological relativity, which gave up the Carnapian distinction between
internal and external existence questions, also crucially shaped Putnam’s approach to the realism
issue. According to Quine and (perhaps) also Putnam, all existence questions have a pragmatic
dimension; thus, the division between internal and external questions collapses together with the
analytic/synthetic distinction. Yet, Putnam’s criticisms of Quine make it clear that he never
followed Quine’s attack on Carnap to the very end, that is, to the final repudiation of the key
14 One might perhaps apply the pragmatic maxim to find out what, if any, the key difference between Vienna Circle
verificationism and Putnam’s 1980s verificationism was. These might come up as practically identical positions.
7Carnapian distinction – even though he agrees with Quine (and Wittgenstein) rather than Carnap
that “[w]hat Carnap is  trying to do in ‘Semantics,  Empiricism and Ontology,’  it  would seem to
both Quine and Wittgenstein,  is  to find an external standpoint from which to condemn external questions
as meaningless” (Putnam 2012, 345). Thus, while Quine (often described as the “killer” of logical
positivism) remained, according to Putnam (1990), “the greatest logical positivist”, Putnam
himself remains faithful to fundamental principles of logical empiricism until this day.
Even though Putnam does not strictly speaking subscribe to Carnapian criteria of
meaning or to the view that external questions of existence are literally meaningless, it is
legitimate to conclude that whenever Putnam defends a position close to, say, James’s or
Dewey’s  pragmatism  (or  pluralism),  he  does  this,  as  we  may  say,  in (and not despite) his
Carnapian mode.  Neopragmatism more  generally  –  at  least  Putnam’s  and  Rorty’s  –  is  primarily  a
language-oriented form of pragmatism in contrast to the more experience-based classical
pragmatism (cf. Hildebrand 2003). This also indicates how strongly “Carnapian” (rather than, say,
“Deweyan”) Putnam’s neopragmatist position on realism vs. antirealism is.
However, we should take seriously the Kantian elements of Putnamian
neopragmatism, and of logical empiricism, even though this cannot be done here in any detail. It
is perfectly possible for the neopragmatist to admit that our ontologies are humanly constructed
in  a transcendental sense while the objects and processes of the world we postulate within such
ontological theorizing remain empirically (and, hence, factually, causally, and otherwise)
independent of us and our theories. Thus, empirical ontological commitments internal to our
frameworks have, and need, an extra-human standard (viz., the way things are, when seen
through that framework), while the adoption of the framework itself is a kind of transcendental
activity only pragmatically decidable – or criticizable. This idea, if further developed, comes close
to Lewis’s (1929) “pragmatic a priori”. Kantian apriorism, and particularly transcendental
idealism, however, are nothing that Putnam would be willing to embrace. Putnam points out
repeatedly that we should not confuse “making up” our notions with “making up” real systems in the
world, unless we want to “slide into idealism”, which is “a bad thing to slide into” (Putnam 2012,
64). Now, this is itself a Carnapian distinction, echoing the external vs. internal contrast again.15
It is, arguably, a distinction that the classical pragmatists already cast a critical eye on while
preserving (in my view) it in a pragmatic form. Something like the transcendental vs. empirical
distinction must be made in order for Putnam’s own realism-with-conceptual-relativity to
succeed.
15 Kant (1781/1787) himself would not recommend confusing the two, either, because the things in themselves, in
his view, clearly are not “made up”.
8In brief, Putnam’s Carnapianism comes down to a deep-seated fear of metaphysics.
Even if pragmatically needed, metaphysics is to be avoided. Putnam does not, then, seem to be
sufficiently receptive to the pragmatist idea (arguably at work in James, among others) that
metaphysics should not be a priori dismissed but should itself be pragmatically elaborated and examined;
its true practice-involving core ought to be traced out by employing the pragmatic maxim in an
ethically engaging way (Pihlström 2009). This is understandable, as logical empiricism generally
was a strongly anti-metaphysical movement. In A.J. Ayer’s memorable phrase, “no statement
which refers to a ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all possible sense-experience can possibly
have any literal significance” (Ayer 1946, 46). Philosophy must be sharply distinguished from
age-old metaphysical speculation (ibid., 55ff.); metaphysics can only have poetic, aesthetic, moral,
emotive, or expressive value – instead of any cognitive value (ibid., 59-61). In particular, Ayer
argues that the problem of realism vs. idealism, metaphysically construed, is “fictitious”, devoid
of any cognitive or theoretical content (ibid., 54-55, 182-193). In a similar vein, Moritz Schlick
rejected the realism issue as meaningless metaphysics: “The denial of the existence of a
transcendent external world would be just as much a metaphysical proposition as its assertion;
the consistent empiricist does not therefore deny the transcendent, but declares both its denial
and its affirmation to be equally devoid of meaning.” (Schlick 1932-33, 54.) We can easily find a
host of similar statements not only from Carnap’s writings but also, by extension, from Putnam’s.
3. Science and metaphysics: Eino Kaila’s logical empiricism revisited
Although I speculated about neopragmatism’s possible emergence in relation to the Carnapian
principle of tolerance, it could be argued that neopragmatism emerged, instead of 1934, already
in 1929-30 when Ludwig Wittgenstein returned to work on philosophical problems after the
decade he had, following the publication of the Tractatus,  spent  as  a  teacher  in  rural  Austria.
Wittgenstein’s relation to pragmatism is a complex issue not to be explored here (Pihlström
2012a). However, we may explore some less well known cases. I will, thus, offer an excursion to
the views of an internationally relatively marginal twentieth-century philosopher. One of the
somewhat neglected logical empiricists, the Finnish philosopher Eino Kaila, 16  was an early
16 Kaila (1890-1958) was one of the most important Finnish philosophers of the twentieth century. He never gained
the international recognition that his pupils Georg Henrik von Wright and Jaakko Hintikka enjoyed; indeed, these
philosophers, trained by Kaila, as well as their students, were largely responsible for the way in which Finnish
philosophy emerged as a significant part of the international tradition of analytic philosophy grounded in logical
empiricism. Yet, it is no exaggeration to say that Kaila brought scientifically-oriented analytic philosophy to Finland
in the late 1920-30s, with close contacts with leading logical empiricists such as Carnap, Reichenbach, and Schlick.
9admirer of James. In his 1912 essay on James, now available as an English translation,17 Kaila
discussed  James’s  pragmatism  very  sympathetically.  He  was  never  a  pragmatism  scholar  or  a
follower  of  James,  but  it  is  an  intriguing  historical  fact  that  he  was,  at  an  early  stage,  seriously
interested in and influenced by James’s pragmatism. This early encounter with pragmatism still
shows in his logical empiricist works. In the late 1920s, Kaila became an external member of the
Vienna Circle and may even have coined the phrase, “logical empiricism” (he never referred to
his own thought as “logical positivism”).18 If we regard the dialogue with logical empiricism as
crucial to the development of neopragmatism, we might see the latter as beginning to emerge
when Kaila’s views started to take shape in 1912 – that is, when this future logical empiricist
drew inspiration from James’s “will to believe”.
Pragmatism was, for the young Kaila, a promising perspective on the controversy
between science and religion. This issue was one of his great interests, presumably partly because
of his family background.19 Kaila took the scientific challenge to religion seriously, to the extent
that he ended up as a major critic of traditional religion; yet, while he firmly rejected dogmatic
religious creeds, he never completely abandoned the “romantic” tendencies of metaphysical and
religious thinking. In the 1912 essay on James, Kaila was still relatively sympathetic to religion.
He emphasizes the significance of James’s pragmatism as a revolutionary approach in philosophy,
adopting the “agent’s perspective” instead of the perspective of a mere passive spectator. He
views pragmatism as an answer to the problem of how a person who refuses to give up reason or
make easy intellectual compromises can deal with her/his religious needs, or the need for a
higher “spiritual” content and meaning in life. Kaila not only endorses James’s “will to believe”
but explicates this idea in an illuminating way. A religious or “idealist” hypothesis concerning the
significance of human life in relation to a more spiritual and “eternal” universe can, he maintains,
be entertained at the individual believer’s own risk, and it is better to act on such an insecure
belief than to fall into skeptical inactivity.
Later, as a logical empiricist, Kaila was “officially” sharply critical of religion. The
mature Kaila of the 1930-40s was primarily a philosopher of science, introducing modern logical
and epistemological ideas in Finland. Metaphysical and religious statements, he argued, fail to
meet the criteria of meaningfulness set by the philosophers of the Vienna Circle. Kaila’s criticism
17  His essay, “William James – Amerikan filosofi”, originally published in Finnish in Uusi Suometar (a leading
conservative newspaper) in September 1912, was recently made available as an English translation by Heikki A.
Kovalainen in the Transactions  of  the  Charles  S.  Peirce  Society (2011). This essay is discussed in detail in Pihlström
(2012b).
18 For secondary literature on Kaila, see Niiniluoto et al. (1992) and Niiniluoto and Pihlström (2012). Kaila’s key
writings have been translated into English in Kaila (1979).
19 His father, Erkki Kaila (who wrote a textbook on the history of philosophy in 1914), later became the arch-bishop
of the Finnish Lutheran Church, and there were other important clergymen in the family as well.
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of metaphysics culminates in the “principle of testability” (a variation of Carnap’s and
Reichenbach’s related principles): any statement about reality must be constructed so that a set of
empirical statements (its “real content”) can be derived from it; the truth or probability of the
statement can only be assessed on the grounds of its real content.20 While metaphysical and
religious views are not scientifically acceptable in this sense, they may, as Kaila suggests in his
psychological magnus opus on personality (1934), function as “spiritual insurance companies”
defending us against various threats of life, especially the fear of death.
Accordingly, Kaila pragmatistically argued that religious and metaphysical
worldviews may be “practically testable”, even if they cannot meet the rigorous requirement of
empirical testability applied to scientific theories because of their minimal “real content”. What
Kaila calls practical testability has nothing to do with the real content of beliefs; rather, it focuses
on their results in practical action and ways of life. Religious and metaphysical ideas may serve as
motives for action, and they may even be accepted insofar as their practical results are acceptable
(Kaila 1943). Religions may be acceptable as “systems of action”, not as systems of beliefs. Their
“practical truth” must be distinguished from “truth in the proper sense”, which is the concern of
scientific theories (ibid., 190). Kaila thus proposes to apply, “without restrictions, the way of
thinking called pragmatism”, to metaphysical “explanations of the world”, pointing out that
pragmatism leads to contradictions when applied to theoretical conceptions of the world but
may be legitimately applied to “views of life”: “From their fruits you shall know them. Those
views of life are good which have good fruits.” (Ibid., 189.)
Echoes from the early James essay can be heard here, right in the middle of Kaila’s
logical-empiricist period. There are, more generally, important parallels between Kaila and James,
even if we consider Kaila’s mature work. Both were – especially at an early career-stage –
psychologists as much as philosophers. Moreover, both were extremely broad in their intellectual
scopes, combining scientific perspectives with “romantic” sentiments focusing, rather, on art and
religion. Indeed, Kaila’s late work, Syvähenkinen elämä (Deep-Mental Life, 1943), which I just cited,
is explicitly a dialogue between a scientifically-minded and a romantically-oriented character with
process-metaphysical ideas. In Kaila’s case, perhaps more than James’s, the scientific “ego” was
stronger. However, even in that late work, James’s voice can be heard in the “romantic”
character – as Kaila  admits both in the preface and in the dialogue itself  (ibid.,  8,  202).  Indeed,
the romantic character of the dialogue points out, as James might have done, that theoretical and
practical testability may in the end collapse into one another, especially when we are dealing with
“theories about the spiritual”; Kaila even here follows James’s suggestion that God may need our
20 This principle is spelled out in more detail in the essays (from the early 1930s) translated in Kaila (1979).
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faith as a support of His existence (ibid., 192-193). This is a suggestion that the “winner” of the
dialogue, Kaila’s scientific ego, firmly rejects, but one can hardly deny that Kaila was internally
tormented by these diverging ideas,  partly  as a result  of his  early admiration of James.  He may
have seen the identification of theoretical and practical testability as a temptation of his own
philosophical temperament (to employ a Jamesian concept), a temptation he succeeded in
resisting. The two voices of the dialogue are both genuinely his own, while the scientific one
prevails.
The tension we have located in Kaila  serves as a reminder of the fact  that  logical
empiricism and pragmatism may also function as different “voices” within a single philosopher.
Arguably, this is true about Putnam, too. It may even – before the emergence of logical
empiricism – have been true about James, who was both an empirical scientist and a “romantic”,
religiously inclined thinker. At a meta-level, we should, I believe, cherish a pragmatic attitude that
celebrates, instead of seeking to eliminate, this enriching dialogue of potentially conflicting voices.
The Carnapian dimensions of neopragmatism are also just one voice, not the final truth about
neopragmatism.
Furthermore,  the  Kaila  case  –  like  Putnam’s  case  later  –  should  lead  us  to
appreciate the way in which both pragmatism and logical empiricism were (and are) concerned
with the issue of scientific realism, on the one hand, and the debate on the relation between science
and other human practices, on the other. Logical empiricism, as is well known, collapsed (to the
extent that it ever did collapse) partly as a result of the rise of scientific realism due to such
philosophers as Karl Popper and Wilfrid Sellars. Pragmatism, in turn, finds itself in constant
struggle to keep a balance between realism, empiricism, and (Kantian-like, Kuhnian)
constructivism, and in this struggle the possible dominance of science over other human
practices, such as art, morality, religion, or everyday life, is continuously on the agenda. The
problem of scientific realism seems to unite these concerns, because they ultimately come back
to the question of whether science offers us a picture of the world that is “first-rate” or
ontologically prior in comparison to other – merely “second-rate” – accounts of reality. The
dialogue between pragmatism and whatever remains from logical empiricism also needs to be
continued by focusing on these issues, that is, scientific realism (in relation to empiricism and
constructivism) and the place of science in human culture (in relation to other human practices).
These issues are in the end intimately connected, because the stronger and the more exclusively
scientistic one’s realism becomes, the less one is able to take other practices ontologically
seriously. Putnam’s work on realism has been constantly alarmed by these scientistic threats and
sought to overcome them while not giving up realism altogether.
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This takes us to Kaila again. The point of bringing him into this discussion was not
just to note that he was one of the later logical empiricists who read James in the 1910s (and here
he wasn’t alone, as James was well known in Europe). It is vital to observe that he never
regarded philosophical problems, especially the “problem of reality” or realism as meaningless
pseudoproblems. His philosophy was closer to the pragmatic, scientifically sensitive metaphysical
approach  that  the  classical  pragmatists  favored  –  at  least  at  the  meta-level  if  not  in  details.  He
resisted metaphysics and wanted philosophical thought to be “deep and clear” instead of
“shallow and muddled” (as he considered the metaphysics of German idealism and especially
Heidegger’s philosophy to be), but he was nevertheless a “synthetic” (rather than analytic)
philosopher of nature (rather than of language). I am not saying that we should endorse his
views, but his synthetic approach is at a meta-level relevant for the pragmatist today, also because
of its ability to accommodate conflicting “voices”.
Even when defending an empiricist criterion of testability, Kaila was ultimately
interested in how we are able to formulate meaningful scientific statements about reality. Thus,
implicitly following Peircean pragmatism, he regarded science as a process of examining “real
things”, not just a process of, say, systematizing observations or of predicting and controlling
phenomena. Indeed, philosophy itself in the end concerns the ways we are related to reality; it is
not merely concerned with the meanings of language. Coming close to Putnam’s later internal
realism, Kaila spoke, in a posthumous paper, “The Perceptual and Conceptual Components of
Everyday Experience” (Kaila 1979, chapter 4), about the “relativization of reality”. He argues
that there is no sharp, unequivocal contrast between the “real” and the “unreal”; rather,
conditions for calling a thing “real” can be arranged into a sort of logical hierarchy. In particular,
he distinguishes between perceptual objects, physical objects of everyday experience, and
physico-scientific objects investigated in physical science. As one proceeds from perceptual to
scientific objects, the degree of invariance –  stability,  immutability  –  and  the  degree  of
conceptualization of the relevant objects increase. The difference between the perceptual and the
conceptual components of experience is a relative difference, not an absolute one. Yet, the more
invariant the objects (or the “reality” examined) are, and the more general the relevant
invariances are, the more the objects are conceptualized. (Ibid., chapter 4, sections 9-10.) What is
real  is  not  independent  of  the  way  in  which  it  is  conceptualized  by  us;  there  is  no
unconceptualized reality. Kaila’s relativization of reality is, however, exactly this: a relativization
of reality, not just language or conceptual schemes.
Clearly, science is absolutely central for Kaila in approaching the “riddle of reality”
(see ibid., and Niiniluoto 1992). His position resembles scientific realism in the sense that it is
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science  that  is  taken  to  get  us  closer  to  reality.  The  metaphysical  status  of  the  real  remains  a
subtle issue in Kaila,  though – and as I  already suggested,  this  subtlety is  readily  comparable to
Putnam’s worries about realism.21 Both Putnam and Kaila seriously confront the problem of
reconciling the realist view that the objects we experience and speak about, in scientific and
everyday contexts, exist independently of us with the pragmatist (or “internal realist”) view that
those objects are not unconceptualized or “ready-made” independently of our conceptual
interventions but are always already conceptualized by us in order for them to be able to be any
objects at all. The analogy to Carnapian linguistic frameworks as something that enable us to
identify certain existing objects should be obvious; for both Kaila and Putnam, the need to
reconcile realism with conceptual relativity may have become a central, life-long philosophical
concern as a result of their encounters with Carnap and logical empiricism. I am not conceived
that any of these philosophers has been able to offer a completely satisfactory solution to this
problem of reality. But they all prepared the ground for neopragmatist contributions.
Finally, Kaila’s and Putnam’s views on values are also interestingly comparable, as
they again reveal their somewhat troublesome reactions to logical empiricism. Neither
philosopher offers any full-blown metaphysical theory of values as elements of reality or (in
Putnam’s  case)  of  the  fact-value  entanglement;  rather,  the  inseparability  of  fact  and  value  is
accounted for linguistically and conceptually by Putnam, as an inseparability of factual and
evaluative statements and concepts, while Kaila’s “official” position is an emotivist and
subjectivist theory of values along the lines of logical empiricism. However, both also seem to
maintain these quasi-logical-empiricist ideas partly against their own will. Kaila regarded
spirituality or “deep-mentality” (syvähenkisyys) as the highest value of human life, realized in
science and art, for instance, and this seems to need a value-realist backing (which, perhaps,
could be available in the kind of romantic philosophy of nature he was inclined toward despite
his logical empiricism); Putnam, in turn, has repeatedly reminded us that values, after all, are not
“queer” objects (presumably also because they are no objects at all) and that science and ethics
are equally realistic and cognitive practices. In a revealing passage, Putnam (1990) says that if he
were a metaphysician (implying, that is, that he is not),  he  would  construe  the  world  as  a
collection of “permanent possibilities of obligation”. Again, we see the tension between
21 Niiniluoto (1992, 109) suggests that Kaila’s view on realism was in an interesting way close to Sellars’s distinction
between the scientific image and the manifest image. Everyday objects could be regarded as epistemologically prior
but ontologically secondary to scientific objects, that is, to the scientific image of the world. Niiniluoto continues
with a comparison to Putnam: “Kaila was not a ‘metaphysical realist’ in Putnam’s sense: the existing objects are not
‘ready made’ waiting for us, since the more real objects are also more conceptualized. So in the end Kaila may have
been a  kind  of  ‘internal  realist’.  But,  in  spite  of  his  talk  about  the  ‘relativization  of  reality’,  he  was  not  a  relativist.
There is a sense in which physical and scientific objects are objective, independent of us and our perceptions.” (Ibid.,
112-113.) This picture of Kaila on realism, science, and metaphysics is supplemented in several essays in Niiniluoto
and Pihlström (2012).
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metaphysics and anti-metaphysics at work in Kaila’s and Putnam’s accounts of value. Philosophy,
for both, is ultimately about “ultimate questions”, and clearly logical empiricism as such is
insufficient to deal with them, though healthy doses of logic and empiricism may be necessary
for us to pursue them responsibly.
4. Conclusion
Contemporary pragmatism and neopragmatism should recognize not only their roots at Harvard
(e.g., Peirce, James, Lewis) and Columbia (e.g., Dewey, Nagel) but also their logical-empiricist
Viennese background – and should do so in many areas: in metaphysics, anti-metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, and philosophy of religion, among others. This essay
has partly focused on Putnam’s neopragmatism, which is an illuminating case because of its
indebtedness to Carnap’s ideas of “tolerance” and linguistic frameworks; however, the moral of
the discussion is more general. Pragmatism is at its best when it flexibly engages in collaboration
with other philosophical orientations – including not only analytic philosophy but also
phenomenology, hermeneutics, critical theory, etc. – while maintaining its own identity.
Forgotten figures of the logical empiricist movement, such as Kaila, and their reception of
pragmatism, should also be explored more deeply. Pragmatism, generally, ought to speak – and
also listen22  – not only to the well-known philosophical orientations today, such as analytic
philosophy or phenomenology, but also to the marginalized and eclipsed ones, whether or not
pragmatism itself was ever truly eclipsed by logical empiricism or analytic philosophy.
A  certain  kind  of  focus  on philosophical anthropology (so to speak) ultimately
distinguishes pragmatism from logical empiricism at least in its standard forms. For pragmatism,
the human being is at the center of philosophical inquiry; it is more important to understand
human experience in its richness, individual and communal, than it is to get clear about the
structure of scientific theories, for instance (though these are by no means conflicting pursuits).
While the two philosophies share a common interest in the prospects of scientific realism, as
explained, the contexts within which this problem is approached differ perhaps more deeply than
is sometimes acknowledged – and this may result from the diverging approaches to the question
concerning the place of science in human culture. A true revolution in philosophy would offer a
new response to that question, maintaining both the value of science and the value of human
22 Cf. David Hildebrand’s apt remark on pragmatism as a “listening philosophy” (in conversation, May 2013).
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freedom and constructive interpretation in our world-engagement. But that can only be a
revolution yet to come, not a revolution to be found in our philosophical past.23
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